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CRIMINAL ACTION IS PENDING-

Subsequent to the filing of an information against him before a Justice of the
Peace by the Secretary of Agriculture of the State of Iowa for violation of the
Iowa Cream Grading Act,1 plaintiff applied to the District Court for an injunction against the proceeding before the Justice, and requested a declaration that he
was not subject to the act. The District Court denied the injunction, but issued a
decree declaring that plaintiff was not subject to the Cream Grading Act. On
appeal, held, affirmed. Where complicated legal issues cannot be determined with
equal facility by a Justice of the Peace because of his lack of knowledge of law, a
declaratory judgment is proper. Dissent: since the State Constitution grants
jurisdiction to the Justice of the Peace, his lack of legal skill is no basis for
making an exception to the rule that a declaratory judgment will not be granted
after information has been filed in a criminal proceeding. Ostrander v. Linn,
(Iowa 1946) 22 N.W. (2d) 223.
In the past, courts have been extremely reluctant to interfere with the
prosecution of criminal proceedings, on the ground that the use of judicial process
to restrain criminal actions would be an unwarranted meddling with the administrative branch of government. 2 The better and more recent view is that the
declaratory judgment is ideally fitted, and should be used more frequently, to test
the applicability and constitutionality of regulatory statutes containing penal
clauses.8 Although the courts have uniformly refused to intervene after the

Iowa Code (1946) c. 195.
Reed v. Littleton, 275 N.Y. 150, 9 N.E. (2d) 814 (1937); Moresh v.
O'Regan, 122 N.J. Eq. 388, 192 A. 831, dissent 194 A. 156 (1937); see discussion,
BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 1022 (1941).
8 BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 1022 et seq. (1941).
1
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initiation of a criminal action, 4 declaratory relief is sometimes given by a federal
court where a civil action against an insurer is pending in a state court. 5 However, these cases have been distinguished on the ground that federal and state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction,6 and, furthermore, the recent tendency has
been to refuse a declaration when the same issues are involved in the state
court.7 In many of the cases dealing with this question, there is language to the
effect that declaratory relief is refused only because the issues can be finally determined in the prior case and a declaratory judgment would serve no useful
purpose. 8 Where it appears that the issues cannot be determined in the earlier
suit, it is reasonable that a declaratory judgment should be given, although
declaratory relief is not proper wheri the same result can be obtained by appeal
to the court which is asked to give the declaratory judgment. 9 The inferior
legal ability of a Justice of the Peace, on which the majority largely bases its
decision in the principal case, does not seem to be proper ground for avoiding the
rule that a declaration will not be given when there is another suit pending.10
Courts of equity will intervene to restrain future prosecutions where it appears
that threatened multiple suits will cause irreparable property damage, even
though prosecution has been commenced prior to the request for a declaration.11
Under Iowa law, an appeal from-the judgment of a Justice Court results in a
trial de novo on the merits.12 If the plaintiff in the principal case is unsuccessful
in his defense before the Justice and wishes to appeal, he will have to institute
what amounts to a new proceeding in the district court. While his appeal is
pending, he will be faced with the alternative ?f suspending his business or being
4 Updegraff v. Atty. Gen., 298 Mich. 48, 298 N.W. 400 (1941); Spence, Ch~ef
of Police v. Cole, (C.C.A. 4th, 1943) 137 F. (2d) 71; 23 CoRN. L. Q. 314 (1938).
5 Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Marr, (D.C. Okla. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 217; Employers' Liability Corp. v. Ryan, (C.C.A. 6th, 1940) 109 F. (2d) 690.
6 State ex rel. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Terte, Judge, 351 Mo. 1089, 176 S.W.
(2d) 25 ( 1943).
7 Dewey Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 62 S. Ct. II73
( 1942), in which the court suggests that the refusal of jurisdiction be made mandatory
where the issues can be settled in a suit pending before a state court.
8 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, (C.C.A. 4th, 1937) 92 F. (2d) 321;
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Faulkner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 126 F. (2d) 175; Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Consumers Fin. Service Inc., (C.C.A. 3d, 1938) IOI F. (2d) 514.
9 Jefferson County ex rel. Coleman v. Chilton, 236 Ky. 614, 33 S.W. {2d) 601
(1930), in which the court says that giving a declaratory judgment " ..• would, in a
real sense convert our jurisdiction from appellate into original by means of a circuitous procedure not contemplated by the Constitution."
1 ° Carbide & Carbon Chem. Co. v. U.S. Ind. Chem., Inc., (C.C.A. 4th, 1944)
140 F. (2d) 47 at 49. The court says, "when it is said in the cases that declaratory
relief should be refused 'where a proceeding involving identical issues is already pending
in another tribunal where they can be tried with equal facility,' the 'equal facility' refers
to matters affecting the convenience of parties and witnesses and the position of the case
on the docket as affecting a speedy hearing, not to the knowledge or lack of knowledge
of the trial judge."
11 Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 247 App. Div. 591, 288 N.Y.S. 239 (1936); Cline
v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 47 S. Ct. 681 (1927).
12 lowa Code (1946) § 601.91; Yost v. Gadd, 227 Iowa 621,288 N.W. 667
(1939).
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subjected to numerous further prosecutions. Since the plaintiff alleges that
further proceedings are threatened, there are grounds for the intervention of a
court of equity to prevent irreparable damage to his property.13 In view of the
fact that the declaratory judgment is designed to give broader relief than the
older equity procedure,14 a declaration should be proper in such a case even
though there is a criminal action pending. Unlike a declaratory judgment based
on the inability of a Justice of the Peace to determine complicated questions of
law, a judgment based on these grounds is not a usurpation of the constitutional
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace. The declaration is designed to protect
the plaintiff against future proceedings, not to interfere with the present action
before the Justice on the theory that such a court is not competent to deal with
the problems involved.

Robert E. Walsh, S. Ed.

18 Cowan v. City of Buffalo, 247 App. Div. 591 at 598, 288 N.Y.S. 239 (1936).
The court said, "The moving papers, however, go further, and allege that defendants
threaten to arrest and prosecute the plaintiff for all subsequent infractions of the regulation. • • • Under such circumstances it may be fairly said ..• that he [ the plaintiff]
has brought himself within the exception to the rule that equity will not restrain the
enforcement of a void ordinance."
14 Sunshine Miniitg Co. v. Carver, United States Dist. Atty., (D.C. Idaho 1940)
34 F. Supp. 274. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS, 2d ed., 1022 et seq. (1941).

